“Iran has Said” as Unilateral or Contractual Statement? An Analysis on Iran’s Right to Cease Performing its JCPOA Commitments-Dr. Amir Maghami

Dr. Amir Maghami - Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Isfahan, Iran.
2025/08/05

Paragraph 13 of the UNSC resolution 2231 (2015) provided that “notes Iran’s statement that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in whole or in part, Iran will treat this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA.” This provision raises several interpretive questions: Does this reflect a unilateral declaration by Iran, or is it an integral part of the Security Council’s decision? What are the legal implications of such a statement? Moreover, can Iran invoke similar provisions of the JCPOA in response to the reimposition of U.S. unilateral sanctions or the introduction of new ones? While the Security Council is not a judicial body and possesses wide discretion in carrying out its functions under the United Nations Charter, the observance of the JCPOA as a valid resolution and decision of the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Council's own legitimacy, are significant factors in any further action taken by the Council and the international community.

The Nature of the Statement

Paragraph 13 has an important role in enacting JCPOA. It affirmed dispute resolution mechanism provided by JCPOA and the mechanism called “Snapback”. The last part of the mentioned paragraph only refers to legitimacy of Iran withdrawal of its commitments under JCPOA when UNSC sanctions are reimposed because of the Snapback mechanism implication. In fact, JCPOA has a dual nature, an international (political) agreement and a decision of the UNSC under article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Its complexity could be elucidated by previous UNSC resolutions that protect and promote Iran and EU3 3 negotiations to reach a “negotiated solution”. The term “negotiated” makes its contractual nature, when the deal needed the endorsement of the Council to be operative. In relation to paragraph 13 of the resolution, under paragraph 37 of the JCPOA “Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”

Non-Security Council Sanctions

The UNSC resolution 2231 lacks any provision on how Iran’s legal reaction toward reimposition of other sanctions which were lifted by the JCPOA must be; in other words and particularly, sanctions of the United States and European Union against Iran. It can be said that during 2013-2025 none of the United Nations sanctions were reimposed on Iran (until now), and Iran cannot rely on paragraph 13 to diminish or reduce its JCPOA commitments. But whether Iran can justify its degradation of commitments legally or not, that is a matter for further discussion.

The answer can be found in paragraph 1 of the resolution, that stated the Security Council “Endorses the JCPOA, and urges its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA”. Before this statement and as the last sentence of the preamble of the resolution, the council expressed “Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Security Council’s decisions”. Explicit reference to article 25 of the Charter and subsequent “decisions” in the resolution make it clear that the Council is in the position of making decision under article 25 of the Charter “Endorse(d)” the JCPOA and by its decision urging all member States to “full implementation” of the JCPOA. In this regard, the JCPOA’s full implementation is the expected course of conduct from all member States and not only the JCPOA participants. It is obvious that US withdrawal of the JCPOA in the first Trump Administration, reimposing previous US sanctions and imposing new sanctions are clear breaches of the Resolution 2231. There is a difference between use of JCPOA Dispute Mechanism and relying on JCPOA as annex of UNSC resolution 2231. In this regard, only participant States (members) of the JCPOA in the framework of the JCPOA can invoke the dispute mechanism. By its official withdrawal, the US now is not a participant, therefore cannot resort to the dispute mechanism provided by the JCPOA; however, other participants – although they have not fully implemented their commitments, have such legal right to invoke dispute mechanism of the JCPOA.

Let’s return to the second question. Can Iran resort to the resolution to decrease its commitments, when there has not been any reimposition of UNSC sanctions? Based on this reasoning, and since the JCPOA is fully supported by the UN Security Council, Iran's reduction of its commitments could be considered lawful if the JCPOA itself allows for such actions.

Legal Character of Iran’s Response

Under paragraph 26 of the JCPOA, the EU and the U.S. must refrain themselves from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions which were imposed before the implementation day also of imposing new nuclear related sanctions. It continues “Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.” There is no doubt that Iranian economic interest was one of the main purposes of concluding the JCPOA. Even in first negotiations between Iran and European Troika (UK, France and Germany), in 2006 EU proposal package included economic promotions in areas of economy, trade, agriculture, aviation, etc. In exchange of continuing voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment. Also after the Luzan Framework and during JCPOA negotiations, negotiating parties emphasized that ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear energy and, in return, lifting sanctions against Iran are the main goals of the negotiations to reach a “negotiated solution”.

It is of significant importance to note that in a number of paragraphs of the JCPOA including paras. 13, 26 and 36 phrases such as “Iran Said…” or “Iran Statement” are used similarly. The participants clearly refrain from other words or phrases such as “Iran can”, “Iran allowed” and similar wording. The word “Notes” in paragraph 13 used in other resolutions for expressing a matter of law or valid subject. The Council by using “notes” usually acknowledges the existence of a content of a report, situation, or communication. It may be said that the Council is referencing Iran’s explicit position: that if sanctions “snapback” under paragraph 12 occurs, Iran would consider that a breach sufficient to suspend its JCPOA commitments and the term “Notes” signals that this assertion is formally placed on the Council’s record—but is distinct from endorsing or validating it. “Notes Iran’s statement…” is effectively a recording tool and it puts Iran’s declared intent into the Council’s operative language and architecture. It gives the Council an acknowledgment that is made by itself and may guide how its own mechanisms are understood or applied. So, it has no direct binding legal effect under Article 25 of the UN Charter which binds member states to carry out Council decisions, but in the mentioned resolution the Council is in a “endorsing” position to affirm and support the agreement. In other words, when a statement of one party enters into an agreement, this is no longer a unilateral statement, but this statement is a part of the agreement. Also it must consider that economic purposes of Iran are references for interpretation of the instrument, as under the convention of the law of the treaties (VCLT) clearly states that the purpose and subject of the treaty is a reference for its interpretation. The JCPOA as the “negotiated solution” is counterparty deal: no sanctions in exchange of ensuring peaceful nature of Iran nuclear program. The foundation, integrity and entirety of the JCPOA is “a negotiated solution”  under resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010). This implies agreement of all participants. In this regard, the statement of Iran is not a mere unilateral statement, rather it is an agreement between participants which is endorsed by the UNSC resolution.

As a result, it can be said that any action by Iran to reduce or cease its JCPOA commitments that is taken within the framework of Article 26 cannot, shall not and must not be considered or construed as a violation of the JCPOA in any way. Therefore, any “significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA” as “believe” of a “participant member” under paragraph 11 of the resolution - which may cause to “vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution” by the Security Council – must be interpreted and  understood in the context of the integrity and entirety of the JCPOA and Iran’s right to cease its commitments is a main part of the “solution”. First of all, one should note that the belief of a participating party that it is not performing its significant commitments also requires interpretation. It seems that the mere emphasis on the “belief” of one of the parties is not enough to activate the snapback mechanism, but this belief must be formulated within the framework of the JCPOA. The resolution is also clear in this regard that the failure to fulfill significant commitments can be the basis for resorting to this mechanism. As a result, any reduction or cessation in the performance of commitments—when justified within the framework of the JCPOA—cannot, in itself, be construed as constituting a significant non-performance by a participant (in this case, Iran). It is important to underscore that any reduction or cessation by Iran in fulfilling its JCPOA commitments has been in direct response to the United States' withdrawal from the agreement and its reimposition and/or introduction of sanctions against Iran. Notably, there are no reports indicating that Iran violated or failed to perform its obligations under the provisions of the JCPOA—particularly prior to the U.S. withdrawal.

Conclusion

The above analysis shows that although paragraph 13 does not itself create legal rights for Iran, Iran’s statements have become part of the legal framework of mutual obligations through the Council’s endorsement of the JCPOA. Furthermore, paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA explicitly anticipated that in the event of reintroduction of previous sanctions or the imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, Iran can suspend its commitment under the deal. Consequently, Iran’s reduction of its commitments can be legally justified as a form of legal countermeasure or response to prior violations by other participants. These actions do not constitute a breach of the agreement, particularly given that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had verified Iran’s compliance up until the U.S. withdrawal.

The Security Council’s adherence to its own resolutions, as instruments of international law, plays a vital role in strengthening the rule of law and enhancing its legitimacy and efficacy. Reliance on the so-called snapback mechanism—embedded within the JCPOA and Resolution 2231—requires full commitment by all parties to the JCPOA as an integrated and indivisible agreement. If legal interpretation gives way to the political preferences of certain permanent members of the Council, Iran may likewise pursue its own political responses—whose consequences for regional and global stability remain uncertain.
The JCPOA was a comprehensively negotiated framework designed to promote international peace and security through both IAEA verification and the reintegration of Iran into the global economic system. This carefully crafted solution has been significantly weakened by the fragile unilateralism of the United States. Selective invocation of the snapback mechanism by a JCPOA participant not only disrupts legal coherence but also erodes global trust in multilateral diplomacy.