Beyond the Battlefield: The Role of Connectivity Disruptions in Armed Conflicts-Mohammad Mahdi Mohammadi

Mohammad Mahdi Mohammadi – LLM Student in International Law at Tarbiat Modares University
2025/08/26

As societies become more deeply digitalized, connectivity—and particularly internet access—has taken on an increasingly vital role in people’s everyday routines. From leisure platforms that offer entertainment to more critical activities like workplace communication, scheduling medical appointments, or conducting banking operations, digital interaction is now woven into daily life across much of the world. As a result, when connectivity is compromised during periods of conflict or crisis, the consequences can be severe. Within this framework, internet access ceases to be a mere convenience and can, in fact, become a lifeline. Thus, the serious consequences of network disruptions for individuals and communities affected by conflict have recently been highlighted by numerous organizations, such as Access Now, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

In fact, without connectivity, when military operations begin, it may be highly unlikely to get accurate and life-saving information on safe evacuation routes, or about areas affected by hostilities. Individuals attempting to cross international borders in search of safety might find themselves unable to retrieve vital documents and tools stored online. People in areas affected by disruptions may be left without financial resources, and families may face a situation without news about the fate of loved ones; which can have a significant psychological toll, adding to the stress, anxiety and traumas of living through conflict.

The deliberate disruption of connectivity and internet access during armed conflicts has emerged as a complex and increasingly pressing challenge within the framework of international law, particularly under international humanitarian law (IHL). While the core treaties of IHL—most notably the 1949 Geneva Conventions, their 1977 Additional Protocols, and the earlier 1907 Hague Regulations—were developed before the rise of digital communications infrastructure, the fundamental principles embedded within these legal instruments remain fully applicable to the evolving technological and operational realities of modern warfare. Both the Geneva and Hague frameworks collectively emphasize the protection of civilians and civilian objects, the regulation of means and methods of warfare, and the responsibility of belligerents to respect the laws of war even in the face of new technologies such as cyber capabilities and information systems.

In times of armed conflict, the disruption of connectivity can arise from a variety of causes. Frequently, it results indirectly from the impacts of hostilities—such as when technical teams are unable to safely access affected zones to perform repairs or routine maintenance on critical infrastructure, or when shortages emerge due to limited availability of necessary consumables or breakdowns in supply chains.

On the other hand, deliberate interference is becoming increasingly evident in conflict environments. In these cases, disruptions are intentionally imposed—either in territories controlled by the perpetrators or in opposing areas—with the aim of restricting access to communication networks. Such measures may include cyber-attacks targeting Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or telecommunications firms, as well as acts of physical sabotage. In addition, electromagnetic tactics such as signal jamming may be employed to disrupt communication systems temporarily during military operations or, in some cases, impose more enduring effects.

IHL attitude towards connectivity disruptions

At the heart of IHL lies the principle of distinction, enshrined in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, which requires all parties to a conflict to differentiate at all times between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects. This principle has deep roots in earlier codifications such as the 1907 Hague Regulations, particularly Articles 22 and 23, which prohibit the use of methods or means of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering or are otherwise contrary to the laws of war. Civilian communication infrastructure—including internet servers, mobile telecommunications networks, radio broadcasting stations, and emergency communication systems—falls within the category of protected civilian objects unless and for such time as it is being used for military purposes. As long as the primary function of such infrastructure remains civilian in nature, it is entitled to legal protection under both Geneva and Hague law.

When a component of digital communications infrastructure is suspected of serving a dual-use role—facilitating both civilian and military functions—this does not automatically strip it of its protected status under International Humanitarian Law. For instance, the integrated structure that forms the global or national internet is, in most cases, unlikely to be classified as a legitimate military target. Instead, belligerents are obligated to identify specific elements of that infrastructure which directly and effectively support military operations. Moreover, the lawful destruction or neutralization of such infrastructure must offer a concrete and definite military advantage. Considering that armed forces often rely on multiple and redundant communication systems to avoid overdependence on a single channel, the strategic value of targeting civilian communication networks used by the opposing side may be questionable.

Under IHL, such objects must be treated with the highest degree of caution. Even if determined to be a legitimate military objective under Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, any operation directed at such infrastructure must still comply with other rules on the conduct of hostilities, in particular satisfy the principles of proportionality and precaution. In such assessments, particular attention must be given to the length, scope, geographic reach of the disruption, and its impact on civilian lives. Article 51(5)(b) prohibits attacks which may be expected to cause incidental civilian loss or injury that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. These requirements echo the spirit of Article 25 and Article 27 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which forbid the targeting of undefended towns and emphasize the protection of buildings and services indispensable to civilian life.

Which military operations to disrupt connectivity amount to “attacks” under IHL?

IHL defines the notion of attack as an “act of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence”. No doubt occur that physical operation certainly qualifies as an “attack”. In contrast, divergent opinions persist– among states and experts – regarding which forms of cyber operations can be deemed equivalent to such attacks. A growing number of states, along with ICRC, have taken the view that cyber operations resulting in the functional disabling of an object—such as the ICT infrastructure of an internet service provider—may indeed constitute an “attack” under IHL.

Even if the view is taken that certain operations that cause a connectivity disruption do not meet the threshold of an attack and must therefore not comply with all IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities, several IHL rules and principles in particular, the IHL principle of necessity, the principle of distinction as reflected in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, and the obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects, must nonetheless be respected.

When connectivity is disrupted, affected communities are left with limited opportunities to access critical, potentially life-saving information regarding the ongoing hostilities. This lack of perspective elevates their risk of being exposed to violence and physical harm or of suffering from untreated health conditions. Simultaneously, in the absence of reliable channels to verify facts, the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation becomes more likely—placing individuals at greater risk or diverting them from protection and aid efforts. Such dynamics were notably observed during the twelve-day conflict between Israel and Iran, where limited access to verified information exacerbated civilian vulnerability.

In the absence of internet access, the functioning and reliability of essential public services can be severely undermined, as many critical systems now rely heavily on digital connectivity. Increasingly, core infrastructures that support public functions—from healthcare to utilities—depend on uninterrupted online communication to remain operational.

Moreover, with the rise of digital learning platforms as a central component of modern education, _At least it should be assumed that digital learning tools have emerged as key solutions _connectivity disruptions significantly threaten access to learning opportunities. Students may find themselves unable to enroll in academic programs, participate in virtual classes, or complete examinations, ultimately placing their educational continuity at risk.

The growing reliance on digital connectivity in civilian life means that the humanitarian consequences of disrupting communication infrastructure are far-reaching and severe. Interrupting access to the internet, mobile phone services, or public broadcast systems during armed conflict can sever the affected population from vital information {about ongoing hostilities, available humanitarian aid, evacuation corridors, and family reunification mechanisms} which is obviously against the known sprit of humanitarian conventions. It also hampers the work of humanitarian organizations that depend on real-time data and coordination to deliver aid effectively and safely. The ICRC has addressed these concerns in its publication, International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts, affirming that cyber operations and technical actions impacting civilian infrastructure fall within the scope of IHL and must comply with its principles. This interpretation affirms that non-kinetic operations can still constitute unlawful attacks if they result in harm to protected civilian infrastructure.

Furthermore, the ICRC has examined the practical consequences of such disruptions in its report Offline and in Danger: The Humanitarian Consequences of Connectivity Disruptions. The report underscores that in today’s conflicts, digital connectivity is not a luxury but a humanitarian necessity. Denying civilians access to communication—regardless of whether by physical or cyber means—can place entire populations in peril by obstructing life-saving services such as telemedicine, emergency response, and public health advisories. The cumulative effect of these actions often results in widespread, sometimes irreversible harm to the civilian population, thereby violating the humanitarian aims of the Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations.

On the other hand, ICRC in its new report on International humanitarian law and connectivity disruptions during armed conflict, after reaffirming IHL and IHRL as Legal Frameworks Involved and demonstrating IHL Rules on the Conduct of Hostilities _ Distinction- Proportionality and Precautions_, focused on four factors as an Additional Protections Under IHL and IHRL which contain “access to life-saving information, the right to family life, respecting and protecting the medical mission, and respecting and protecting humanitarian operations”.

While the humanitarian impact of connectivity disruptions can be profound, it is equally crucial to recognize that connectivity itself may expose individuals to serious risks. Authorities, armed actors, or other entities may exploit digital networks for surveillance, persecution, or targeting of individuals. Furthermore, under international human rights law, states may impose restrictions on network access when such limitations are justified by legitimate security concerns and are implemented in a lawful, necessary, and proportionate manner. These considerations present complex challenges for humanitarian organizations, which need to navigate and weigh the advantages of digital connectivity against its potential harms, to ensure that they ‘do no digital harm’ in their advocacy or assistance activities.

International human rights law provides further legal protection. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive, and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and through any medium. While certain restrictions are permitted during states of emergency, such limitations must meet strict criteria: they must be lawful, necessary, and proportionate.

Modern legal analyses such as Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations reinforce the convergence of these legal norms in cyberspace. The Manual asserts that cyber operations which have significant effects on civilians or civilian infrastructure—regardless of whether those operations are physically destructive—are subject to the same legal constraints as traditional means of warfare. Drawing on both treaty law and customary international law, the Tallinn Manual recognizes that effects-based analysis is key: operations that cause disruption or deprivation, even without physical damage, can trigger legal responsibility under the law of armed conflict.

In the same direction, during the 34th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, states and Movement components reached a consensus on a resolution aimed at enhancing the protection of civilians from the potential humanitarian consequences of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) activities during armed conflicts. This resolution explicitly acknowledges the vital role of digital connectivity in safeguarding civilians and enabling principled humanitarian action. It emphasizes the need to protect critical infrastructure that supports the general availability or integrity of the internet.

This outcome represents a significant milestone, especially considering the sometimes-polarized discourse surrounding such issues. The resolution underscores the essential nature of ICT access for the delivery of goods and services—including medical care for civilian populations, humanitarian operations, and for enabling individuals to access information about safe locations and life-sustaining resources in an accessible format. It also highlights the role of connectivity in preserving or restoring family links, particularly in the context of armed conflict (PP2).

Humanitarian organizations are increasingly dependent on digital connectivity to deliver rapid and large-scale responses during emergencies. When connectivity is disrupted, it can significantly hinder their capacity to operate effectively and provide timely assistance. Humanitarian actors often rely on digital networks to assess needs remotely—for example, by gathering data from hospitals regarding casualty figures, or by communicating directly with affected individuals to address personal concerns.

Connectivity also plays a crucial role in enabling internal coordination, managing logistics, and sustaining supply chains. Furthermore, humanitarian personnel use digital tools to remotely document potential violations of international law and to carry out urgent, life-saving interventions in real time. In parallel, they may face growing expectations to report what they witness in the field, in order to fill the information void surrounding possible breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law.

In light of these overlapping frameworks, the deliberate and widespread disruption of communications infrastructure during armed conflict cannot be seen as a neutral or purely technical matter. It constitutes a serious legal and humanitarian issue. When such actions are taken without strict adherence to the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution—as articulated in the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations, and international human rights law—they may violate multiple branches of international law. Such violations may result in the legal responsibility of state or non-state actors and could potentially trigger mechanisms of accountability under international legal regimes. In today’s interconnected world, where digital access often makes the difference between life and death in conflict zones, communication infrastructure must be treated not as an expendable convenience but as a protected lifeline under the laws of war.

Ultimately, a range of strategies can help shape legal, policy, protection, and operational responses to ensure that connectivity disruptions do not result in harm or loss of life. Humanitarian diplomacy—alongside protection dialogues with parties to conflict—should underscore the humanitarian consequences of such disruptions and advocate for stronger compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.

Efforts should also prioritize the design of digital infrastructure that supports clearer differentiation between civilian and military digital assets and data, as well as measures to enhance the resilience and integrity of connected systems.

At the same time, humanitarian organizations need to explore how to deliver effective aid in settings where connectivity is limited or unavailable, and to carefully assess the risks, advantages and nuances of providing connectivity as a form of assistance.

In parallel, authorities should consider establishing safeguards to preserve humanitarian actors’ ability to use digital connectivity for urgent and life-saving operations—potentially through granting specific protections, privileges, or operational immunities.