Challenging Collectivism: An Individual Rights Perspective on International Human Rights Law-Ali Nazari Farsani

Ali Nazari Farsani - L.L.M in Public International Law, ATU
2025/10/11

The international human rights framework is frequently celebrated for its universal commitment to protecting human dignity; however, beneath this laudable ideal lies a persistent tension between collectivist approaches—where the interests of groups or states are foregrounded—and the foundational liberal principle that the individual is the true subject of rights. This article explores how overreliance on collectivist thinking within international human rights law may undermine the very freedoms it seeks to protect. In revisiting the theoretical roots of individual autonomy and examining the implications of collectivism, the discussion advocates for a recalibration that reaffirms the primacy of individual rights (John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 1988, p. 15, para 3; J S Mill, On Liberty, 2009, p. 21, para 1). Throughout, the narrative emphasizes that while collective instruments have evolved to protect human dignity following World War II—exemplified by foundational texts like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948, Article 1) and subsequent treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966)—the debate remains as to whether these frameworks fully secure individual freedoms or inadvertently favor collective interpretations.

Early discussions of individual rights can be traced back to Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose works laid the philosophical foundation for the modern liberal state by asserting that individuals possess inherent dignity and rights that cannot be subordinated to collective interests (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762, p. 30, para 2). In the aftermath of World War II, a renewed international commitment to human rights emerged, not only to address the atrocities of the past but also to promote a global order in which individual freedoms are upheld. While instruments like the UDHR established basic principles, further developments through treaties such as the ICCPR and ICESCR served to concretize these rights; yet, as history demonstrates, the balance between collective welfare and individual liberty has long been fraught with challenges. Early observers such as Benjamin Constant cautioned against subordinating individual liberty to collective goals (Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns, 1819, p. 45, para 2), while later thinkers like Friedrich Hayek and Alexis de Tocqueville continued to highlight the dangers of excessive state intervention, a debate that remains relevant today (Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 1944, p. 100, para 3; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835, p. 101, para 4).

In contemporary international human rights law, collectivism refers to legal frameworks and policies that prioritize the interests of groups—whether defined by nationality, culture, or ideology—over the rights of individuals. Proponents argue that such approaches are necessary to address historical injustices and promote social justice on a global scale. They assert that collective rights can serve as an essential counterbalance to entrenched inequalities and help preserve cultural identities amid globalization (Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, 1999, p. 55, para 3). However, critics warn that when collective rights are emphasized at the expense of individual autonomy, the resulting policies may lead to state overreach or majoritarian excesses, as collective goals might be used to justify restrictions on dissent, curtail freedom of expression, or sanction the persecution of minorities (Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2013, p. 67, para 3). This tension also plays out in debates over state sovereignty and cultural pluralism, where measures aimed at preserving social cohesion may simultaneously serve as a pretext for limiting individual freedoms in the name of national unity—a dynamic illustrated in discussions on political repression and cultural identity (Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 1996, p. 88, para 2).

A central tenet of liberal philosophy is the defense of individual autonomy, which asserts that freedom of choice is essential for human dignity and societal progress. Robert Nozick’s work, for instance, underscores the importance of maintaining personal freedoms against intrusive state mechanisms (Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974, p. 42, para 1). International human rights instruments have largely been designed with this principle in mind. Beyond the foundational UDHR, specialized conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women further cement protections for individual dignity by setting robust legal standards (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, Article 2). The evolution of digital rights in recent years provides a contemporary example: as global networks expand, instruments like the European Convention on Human Rights play a crucial role in safeguarding privacy, even as challenges arise from state surveillance measures that threaten to erode these hard-won freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 8; Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security, 2011, p. 37, para 2).

At its core, the debate between collectivism and individual rights revolves around differing theoretical perspectives on social justice and personal liberty. On one side, collectivist theories emphasize social cohesion and community values, while on the other, liberal theories place individual autonomy as the foundation of rights. John Rawls, in his seminal discussion of justice, argues that efforts to redress historical injustices must be balanced so as not to undermine the merit and freedom of individuals (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, p. 63, para 1). In practice, this tension is evident in legal debates where state-led initiatives often clash with individual claims, revealing the complexity of reconciling collective objectives with personal freedoms. H. L. A. Hart’s analysis of legal structures further illuminates the need for clear, accountable frameworks that maintain this balance (H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 1961, p. 82, para 3). Meanwhile, Immanuel Wallerstein’s global systems perspective suggests that legal frameworks can be designed to address collective challenges—such as climate change and human trafficking—without sacrificing the autonomy that is essential to individual rights (Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 1974, p. 45, para 1).

Modern critiques of collectivist approach in human rights law echo earlier concerns about the suppression of individual autonomy. Michel Foucault argued that when collective rights overshadow personal freedoms, a form of “group tyranny” emerges that stifles dissent and marginalizes minority viewpoints (Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 1977, p. 110, para 2). In a similar vein, Edward Said’s reflections on cultural dynamics reveal how appeals to collectivism may mask practices that limit freedom under the pretense of preserving cultural identity (Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, 1993, p. 77, para 2). Furthermore, Hannah Arendt has warned that an unchecked majority can homogenize political and cultural expression, effectively silencing individual voices and reducing the richness of pluralistic societies (Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951, p. 123, para 4).

Achieving a balanced approach to international human rights law requires policymakers to recalibrate legal frameworks so that they adequately protect individual rights without dismissing the value of collective goals. Derek Bok emphasizes the importance of strong institutional checks and public accountability to maintain both academic and societal freedoms—a principle that can be effectively translated into legal policy (Derek Bok, The Struggle for the American University, 1996, p. 95, para 1). Complementing this view, Roscoe Pound’s insights on legal philosophy stress that transparent legal infrastructures and robust judicial oversight are essential for holding both state and non-state actors accountable (Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 1941, p. 60, para 3). Looking ahead, Jürgen Habermas argues that incorporating mechanisms for public participation and oversight will be critical in ensuring that legal systems evolve to meet emerging challenges while keeping individual rights central (Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 1984, p. 150, para 2).

This discussion has examined the persistent tension between collectivist approaches and individual rights within international human rights law. By tracing the historical evolution of liberal thought—from the Enlightenment through modern treaty frameworks—it becomes clear that while collectivist policies may address certain social justice concerns, they risk undermining individual autonomy if not carefully balanced (Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 1945, p. 83, para 2). However, achieving this balance is easier said than done, as demonstrated by the divergence in jurisprudence between the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the question of religious expression in public spaces.

The case of Yaker v France highlights the HRC’s commitment to an individual rights-based approach, rejecting broad policy justifications for restricting fundamental freedoms. The Committee ruled that any limitation on religious expression—such as France’s ban on full-face coverings—must be based on clear and objective criteria rather than abstract concepts like "living together" or national policy preferences. This stands in stark contrast to the ECtHR ruling in SAS v France, where the Court upheld the same ban by deferring to France’s margin of appreciation, a doctrine allowing states discretion in regulating rights to preserve public order. The dissenting opinions within the HRC further illustrate the unresolved tension between the protection of public values and the safeguarding of personal autonomy.

This judicial divergence reinforces the broader argument of this article: collectivist reasoning, when unchecked, can lead to the erosion of individual rights under the guise of public interest. It also highlights the practical challenges of enforcing a truly individual-centered approach in human rights law. Moving forward, international legal bodies must establish clearer guidelines that prioritize objective legal criteria over political discretion, ensuring that collective policies do not override fundamental liberties.

In an era of rapid technological change and shifting geopolitical landscapes, the principles enshrined in international human rights law must be both resilient and adaptable. Seyla Benhabib reminds us that the challenges posed by collectivist interpretations demand a renewed commitment to legal accountability, judicial oversight, and the protection of individual freedoms (Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, 2004, p. 112, para 3). Ultimately, a balanced approach is not a choice between collectivism and individualism but rather an integration of both, ensuring that liberal principles and pragmatic governance work together to safeguard the dignity of every human being. Amartya Sen’s later work underscores that only through such integration can policymakers and legal practitioners hope to achieve a future in which individual autonomy and social justice are mutually reinforcing (Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009, p. 90, para 1).