JCPOA/Resolution 2231’s Alternative Dispute Settlement Mechanisms -Alireza Ranjbar

Alireza Ranjbar - Ph.D. Candidate in Public International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran
2025/08/03

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 in July 2015, establishes a multifaceted framework for addressing compliance disputes among participants. Rather than offering a traditional dispute-settlement procedure, it relies exclusively on political processes and provides for the swift reimposition of UN sanctions lifted under Resolution 2231—the so-called snapback mechanism.

Relying solely on political methods creates a significant shortcoming. Political processes cannot always bring disputes to a definitive close, whereas the peaceful settlement of international disputes aims to achieve clear, effective resolutions. Given the complexity and stakes of JCPOA-related disagreements, these political channels may prove insufficient.

Does the JCPOA—or Resolution 2231—rule out all legal avenues, binding parties strictly to its political procedures? Or does it leave room for recourse to established legal dispute-settlement mechanisms under international law? This note examines whether, and to what extent, legal remedies remain available to parties of the JCPOA.

1. The  Origin and Nature of the Dispute Between Iran and Certain JCPOA Participants

The United States’ unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, followed by the re-imposition and expansion of nuclear-related sanctions in direct contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and fundamental principles of international law, deprived Iran of the benefits bargained for under the agreement while Iran remained bound by its commitments. Simultaneously, the remaining participants (the “4 1”: China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom) failed to ensure full normalization of banking relations, unimpeded petroleum exports, and prompt repatriation of oil revenues, thereby undermining the JCPOA’s very architecture.

In response to inability of members of the JCPOA, on 8 December 2020 the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) adopted the Strategic Action to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Interests of the Iranian Nation, according to which (Article 6), if, within two months, the obligations of the contracting parties including the 4 1, are not fully implemented, and obstacles to normalizing banking relations, lifting all barriers to the export and sale of Iranian oil and oil products, and prompt return of foreign-exchange proceeds persist, then the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran “shall suspend verification measures beyond the IAEA-required safeguards, including voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol.”

Under Resolution 2231 (paras. 2 and 3), the IAEA Director General has the exclusive mandate to verify and monitor Iran’s nuclear-related commitments. The Director General must submit regular compliance reports—and, in cases of “reasonable grounds to believe there is an issue of concern directly affecting fulfillment of JCPOA commitments,” an immediate report—to both the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council. Any material breach by Iran may trigger the JCPOA’s dispute-settlement mechanism (paragraph 36) or, under UNSC Resolution 2231 Article 11, the “snap-back” of all previous UN sanctions.

To date, the Director General has continued to affirm Iran’s basic compliance. Nonetheless, following enactment of the Strategic Action Code, the IAEA reported in mid-2024 that over the past three years, Iran’s suspension of its JCPOA commitments and the removal of all IAEA surveillance and monitoring equipment—compounded by its halt in provisionally applying the Additional Protocol and its failure to reinstate designated inspectors—have gravely undermined the Agency’s verification and monitoring activities. As a result, continuity of knowledge on centrifuge production and inventories, heavy water and uranium conversion, and related nuclear materials has been lost, eroding confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Having said that, the following key facts—underscoring the origin and nature of the dispute among the JCPOA participants—should be taken into account:

The dispute’s genesis lies in an external, politicized act (the U.S. withdrawal), and the ensuing failure of other participants to uphold their binding obligations. Given this political underpinning, purely diplomatic or political remediation within the existing JCPOA architecture is unlikely to yield a sustainable solution.

From a legal standpoint, Iran’s suspension of enhanced verification measures finds support in paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, which authorizes any participant to cease performance “in whole or in part” if an unresolved issue threatens the agreement’s objectives. Moreover, under Articles 18 and 22 of the International Law Commission’s 2001 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, the U.S. re-imposition of sanctions as well as inability of members of the JCPOA to fulfil their obligations constitute an internationally wrongful act, entitling Iran to adopt proportionate countermeasures.

Because the dispute arises from external interference and political deadlock, attempts to resolve it solely through the inter-participant dispute-settlement mechanism, which presupposes mutual good faith and full participation, face significant structural limitations. The current framework was not designed to address such externalities, underscoring the need for supplementary legal or diplomatic avenues.

2. Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms under the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231

The JCPOA establishes a two-tiered dispute-settlement framework in Paragraphs 36 and 37. Paragraph 36 governs intra-JCPOA procedures for addressing allegations of “significant non-performance,” while Paragraph 37 provides for referral to the UN Security Council and the automatic “snapback” of UN sanctions.

Paragraph 36 deals with the JCPOA’s internal dispute procedures, triggers with “Notification of Non-Performance” by a JCPOA participant, indicating significant non-performance by either party. It follows by “Joint Commission Deliberation”, convened within 15 days by the EU’s High Representative, and seeks resolution diplomatically. There might be a “Foreign Ministerial Consultation” (optional) to escalate discussions to ministerial level to build consensus. If unresolved after 35 days, an “Advisory Board Review” with three members—one from each disputing party plus an independent chair—is established. It must render a non‑binding opinion within 15 days; the Joint Commission then has five days to decide. “If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.”

Paragraph 37 dedicates to “Security Council Referral & Snapback Mechanism”. If the issue is still unresolved, any participant may refer the matter to the UN Security Council. In the absence of a Security Council resolution affirming the continuation of JCPOA benefits within 30 days, all previously suspended UN sanctions are automatically reinstated under the snapback provision of Resolution 2231. A critical aspect of Paragraph 37 is the requirement that any complaining participant, when submitting its notification, must also provide ‘a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process’ as outlined in the JCPOA. This procedural safeguard is essential to ensuring that mechanisms like the snapback provision are not invoked arbitrarily, but rather as a last resort following rigorous diplomatic engagement. However, recent statements by France contravene the good-faith obligation set out in paragraph 37 of the JCPOA. For instance, on 3 July 2025, the French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Noël Barrot, announced that France’s decision to pursue reimposition of international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear programme (using the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism) would be conditional upon the release of Cécile Kohler and Jacques Paris, who have been detained since May 2022. Conditioning a snap-back invocation on unrelated political demands undermines the JCPOA’s dispute-settlement framework.

Not only did UNSC Resolution 2231 endorse the JCPOA, it also codified robust monitoring, procurement-control, and dispute-resolution mechanisms—including the sanctions snap-back—in Annex B. It expressly acknowledges JCPOA’s internal dispute procedures and links unresolved disputes to Security Council action. Paragraph 10 endorses recourse to JCPOA procedures for inter-party disagreements, while paragraph 11 establishes a firm timeline: once a formal notification alleging “significant non-performance” is submitted, the Council must consider a draft resolution to maintain JCPOA benefits, and if no draft is introduced within ten days, the issue is automatically referred to the Council.

These provisions operate squarely within the United Nations System and comply with Article 37 of the United Nations Charter (the UN Charter) confirming that the snap-back mechanism is an integral part of the UN framework rather than an external process.

The snap-back mechanism is not subject to veto, allowing any of the JCPOA participants to initiate it. Its invocation window closes on 18 October 2025 (ten years after the JCPOA’s adoption) after which all related nuclear and arms sanctions automatically lapse unless renewed.

3- Dispute Settlement Mechanisms within the United Nations System

Since paragraphs 36 and 37 of the JCPOA operate within the United Nations System, understanding the status and function of UN dispute-settlement mechanisms is essential for identifying potential alternative procedures under the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, recourse to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.” The UN General Assembly reaffirmed this framework in both the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States under the Charter of the United Nations (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625) and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Collectively, these instruments distinguish between political-diplomatic methods (negotiation, mediation, conciliation) and adjudicatory procedures (arbitration, judicial settlement).

Article 2(3) of the Charter further obliges that “[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” The explicit reference to “justice” expands the Charter’s dispute-settlement mandate beyond mere preservation of peace and security, underscoring the requirement of equitable and lawful outcomes in any settlement process.

Pursuant to Chapter VI of the UN Charter, arbitration and judicial settlement are considered obligatory legal avenues for States when initial diplomatic efforts fail to resolve a dispute. The Charter anticipates their application in conflicts arising under international law that pose risks to the preservation of international peace and security—including, but not limited to, boundary and territorial delimitation issues, breaches of diplomatic immunities, and other disputes involving substantive legal obligations of States.

4. Obligations of the E3 and P5 to Invoke Alternative Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

Since the JCPOA’s dispute-settlement framework is embedded within both the Agreement itself and UN Security Council Resolution 2231, this section examines the E3/P5’s obligations to pursue alternative remedies in two contexts: first, as JCPOA participants; and second, within the United Nations Security Council.

4.1. Participants in the JCPOA

The JCPOA’s internal mechanism is activated by any participant’s “Notification of Non-Performance.” Having withdrawn under the first Trump administration, the United States forfeited its right to trigger the snap-back mechanism. Russia and China have publicly supported Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear program and have expressed concerns about the potential collapse of the JCPOA. Consequently, only the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) retain standing to invoke Paragraph 36 procedures.

It is important to note that paragraph 37 of the JCPOA mandates that any referral to the Security Council must be accompanied by a description of the referring Participant’s good-faith efforts to exhaust the dispute resolution process. This requirement sets a substantive threshold, demanding genuine engagement with the JCPOA’s internal mechanisms rather than mere procedural formalities. The duty to act in good faith is entrenched in international law. Article 2(2) of the United Nations Charter obliges every Member “to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties mirrors this principle: “Every treaty in force … must be performed by [its parties] in good faith.” Finally, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625) reaffirms that all States “shall comply in good faith with their obligations … with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Therefore, the E3’s invocation of the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism under paragraph 36 must be conducted in good faith and in compliance with their international obligations. They must acknowledge that the current complex situation stems from the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, the reimposition and expansion of nuclear-related sanctions, and the consequent inability of other JCPOA participants to fulfil their commitments under both the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231.

4.2. Within the United Nations Security Council

Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council plays a pivotal role in dispute settlement:

• Article 33(2) empowers the Council to call upon parties “to settle their dispute by peaceful means” whenever it deems necessary.
• Article 36 authorizes the Council, at any stage of a dispute referred under Article 33 or a similar situation, to:
  1. recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment;
  2. take into account any dispute-settlement arrangements already adopted by the parties; and
  3. consider referring legal disputes to the International Court of Justice in accordance with its Statute.

These provisions reinforce the JCPOA/Resolution 2231 snap-back mechanism as operating squarely within the UN system and under Article 37 of the Charter. It also opens new opportunities for UN Security Council to “recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment” or “consider referring legal disputes to the International Court of Justice in accordance with its Statute” since “the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.” (Article 38)

To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the Security Council itself, and each of its members, must also adhere to the principle of good faith. They may not “fraudulently characterize a situation as a threat to international peace and security” nor misuse the veto to block effective responses to genuine threats. To avoid allegations of politicization, the UN Security Council and its members had better invoke the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice by requesting an advisory opinion on the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, thus subjecting any proposed reimposition of sanctions to independent legal scrutiny and safeguarding the impartiality of Council decision making. General Assembly Resolution 43/51 (1988), entitled “Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security”, in paragraph 15, asks the UN Security Council, where appropriate, to request, at an early stage, that the International Court of Justice render an advisory opinion on any legal question pertinent to the prevention and removal of disputes.

As Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, former President of the International Court of Justice, explained in his 18 December 2020 address to the UN Security Council (para.15), “Such an advisory opinion would not be binding and would not be addressed directly to States, but rendered for the benefit of the Council to clarify a specific legal issue. The Security Council would then be free to do whatever it wishes with such an opinion”.

Invoking the Court’s advisory jurisdiction or resorting to alternative legal procedures likewise falls squarely within the UN Security Council’s authority under Resolution 2231. Paragraph 12 of that resolution expressly empowers the Council to “decide otherwise”, which means all prior Iran-related sanctions resolutions either may be revived ipso facto, or can be, among other things, postponed to an ICJ’s Advisory Opinion by the Council’s decision.

Conclusion

Iran’s calibrated suspension of certain JCPOA commitments constitutes a lawful countermeasure under international law, triggered by the United States’ breach (its withdrawal from the JCPOA and the re-imposition and expansion of nuclear-related sanctions) in defiance of UNSC Resolution 2231. These measures sabotaged the JCPOA’s balance, deprived Iran of its benefits, and rendered the remaining participants unable to honor their reciprocal obligations. To insist that Iran continue full performance while other parties’ default would breach the principle of pacta sunt servanda and undermine equity.

The JCPOA/Resolution 2231 dispute-settlement framework, however, is primarily political and lacks robust impartiality and legal enforceability in extraordinary circumstances. Paragraph 36 procedures demand “good-faith efforts”, and the Security Council’s role under Chapter VI of the UN Charter presupposes justice and sincere cooperation, but neither mechanism adequately addresses external interventions nor guarantees binding outcomes.

To reinforce the rule of law and depoliticize dispute resolution, the E3 and P5 should consider invoking alternative legal avenues:

• International Court of Justice (ICJ): Seek an advisory opinion or contentious case under Article 36 of the UN Charter to clarify parties’ rights and obligations.
• Expedited Arbitration Procedure: Establish an ad hoc tribunal or summary arbitral chamber with a streamlined timetable to render a binding award on alleged non-performance.
• External Fact-Finding or Intervention: Appoint an independent expert panel under JCPOA Annex III or a UNSC mandate to assess compliance and recommend corrective measures.

Such recourse would shift the debate from political posturing to objective legal analysis, compelling France, the United Kingdom, and Germany to demonstrate their commitment to international law and equity. Ultimately, deploying binding judicial or arbitral procedures offers the most credible pathway to restoring JCPOA implementation and upholding the international rule of law.

Speaking of “international rule of law”, this note finds its most fitting conclusion in the words of Judge Joan E. Donoghue, former President of the International Court of Justice, delivered before the Security Council on 12 January 2023:

“On the international plane, it is the behaviour of States that largely determines whether the rule of law is being respected. If States mean what they say when they proclaim their fidelity to the rule of law at the international level, it is incumbent on them to exercise restraint and forbearance. They may not settle their disputes by using or threatening force and must be prepared to have the legality of their conduct evaluated by international courts and tribunals.”