The American–Zionist Aggression Against Iran and the Law of the Jungle -Dr. Mosatafa Fazaeli

Dr. Mosatafa Fazaeli – University of Qom
2026/06/09

The title I have chosen for this post focuses on a perspective that has emerged from the recent practice of the United States of America, particularly in the decades following the end of the Cold War. The most recent manifestation of this approach is the military aggression carried out by this State, together with the Zionist regime, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. I interpret this as the dominance of the law of the jungle over the international community.

The recent illegal American–Zionist war of aggression against Iran began with a highly dangerous terrorist operation that led to the martyrdom of Imam Khamenei, a number of his family members, as well as several Iranian political officials and senior military commanders. Imam Khamenei was not only the highest-ranking official of a State and its head, but also a pious scholar, a religious authority, and a prominent spiritual leader who was beloved by hundreds of millions of Shiite and non‑Shiite Muslims, as well as by many people around the world. He was regarded as a valuable intellectual, cultural, and political figure—one who consistently stood against oppression and in pursuit of justice, and who represented moral and spiritual leadership. Therefore, his assassination was not only a great loss to the Islamic Republic and to the nation and State of Iran, but also an irreparable loss to human society. This human tragedy cannot be justified by any legal, moral, humanitarian, or rational standard. Such an unprecedented crime—one that can only be explained by the malice and evil intentions of its perpetrators—violates the fundamental principles, values, and legal, moral, and humanitarian norms recognized across human cultures and civilizations. More specifically, from the perspective of international law, the nature of this crime constitutes a clear example of a terrorist act carried out simultaneously with military aggression against a historically independent State and a founding member of the United Nations, by two outlaw, norm‑breaking, and rebellious powers—namely, the United States and the Zionist regime.

The principles and norms violated in the commission of this crime and the aggressive attacks against Iran include the following: the principle of the prohibition of the use of force, as stated in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; the principle of non‑intervention in the internal and external affairs of States (a customary rule also affirmed in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter); the principle of the immunity of State officials and internationally protected persons (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 1973); and fundamental norms of international human rights law, particularly the rights to life, security, and peace. Furthermore, the attack on a residential area and on civilians constitutes a violation of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. In addition, carrying out military aggression while ostensibly pursuing a peaceful resolution of the dispute through negotiation may itself amount to an act of treachery, deceit, and bad faith.

The assassination of a prominent religious leader and authority constitutes a violation of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Furthermore, because such an act provokes anger and deep resentment among millions of followers and believers, it may also be regarded as contrary to Article 20 of the Covenant, which prohibits advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.

In general, such reckless and destructive actions not only pose a serious threat to international peace and security, but also risk undermining the very foundations of the international order established under the United Nations Charter—if not demonstrating that those foundations have already been severely weakened. The bitter irony of our time is that the only international body entrusted with maintaining international peace and security, and empowered to adopt binding decisions to fulfill this mission—the United Nations Security Council—is at times chaired by a State that itself has a documented record of committing crimes against peace and is now accused of engaging in similar conduct.

The United Nations collective security system often fails and becomes ineffective when the interests of a permanent member of the Security Council are at stake, particularly when such a member is itself responsible for a threat to or breach of international peace and security. The repeated use—or rather, abuse—of the veto power by the United States has prevented the Zionist regime from being held accountable for nearly eight decades of occupation, the denial of the Palestinian people’s right to self‑determination, and the commission of systematic and widespread crimes against the Palestinian population. Furthermore, during the two imposed American‑Zionist wars against Iran, this use of the veto power has also prevented the Security Council from adopting the necessary and appropriate measures.

However, the violation of the above‑mentioned rights and obligations, both at the outset of and during the current illegal war of aggression, constitutes a breach of the law governing the resort to force (jus ad bellum) as well as the law applicable in armed conflict (jus in bello). Such violations, in addition to giving rise to the international responsibility of the United States, the Zionist regime, and all other powers that in some way contributed to the occurrence of this war, may also entail the individual criminal responsibility of the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the Zionist regime, and other actors involved in the commission of these crimes. Accordingly, those responsible may be subject to criminal prosecution before national and international courts.

International law professors, judges, and independent legal experts are expected to call upon the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to take prompt action to initiate the necessary steps toward the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for these crimes. In addition, the domestic courts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the national courts of certain other States, may also act through the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, survivors and victims of the aforementioned crimes may submit and pursue their complaints before any competent court available to them. In particular, the killing of schoolgirls aged six to twelve in Minab must be subject to a separate and thorough investigation, while each of the thousands of other alleged crimes attributed to American and Zionist actors may likewise constitute the basis for separate legal proceedings.

The Principle of Good Faith

I would like to examine the issue of the American‑Zionist aggression from another perspective—namely, the principle of good faith as one of the general principles of law.

As we know, one of the main sources of international law is the general principles of law. According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, these are the principles recognized by civilized nations. The term civilized nations refers to any political and social order grounded in the rule of law. In other words, general principles possess such inherent validity and importance that no legal system can function or endure without them.

It should be noted that one of the most fundamental and widely recognized general principles of law is the principle of good faith. This principle is essential both at the stage of the creation of obligations and at the stage of their implementation. In essence, the concept of good faith may be expressed in a single word: honesty.

Accordingly, when States declare their willingness to negotiate and engage in dialogue in order to resolve a dispute between them, the principle of good faith requires that both parties make genuine efforts to settle the dispute peacefully and in an honest and sincere manner. Likewise, when they reach an agreement through negotiation, good faith requires that they comply with it faithfully and implement their commitments in practice. It is clear that if there is no trust in the honesty and good faith of the parties—or even of one of them—whether during the stage of negotiations or in the implementation of the agreements reached, peaceful methods and mechanisms will not function as intended. In such circumstances, the rule of law gives way to lawlessness and chaos.

The actions of the United States—on two occasions approximately eight months apart—by carrying out military attacks against Iran during the course of negotiations made it clear that the American side had shown not the slightest good faith or honesty. Moreover, previous experience had already demonstrated that even if negotiations were to lead to an agreement and the conclusion of a treaty, little confidence could be placed in the United States’ good faith in adhering to it. This was clearly illustrated by the U.S. government’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, an agreement that had been reached after nearly two years of negotiations between Iran and the P5 1.

Failure to observe good faith in negotiations and in the implementation of resulting agreements deals a serious blow to both society and the international system. It weakens the motivation and willingness of States to resort to peaceful methods of dispute settlement, leading them to conclude that, in the absence of good faith, such methods are not reliable. As a result, they may feel compelled to prepare themselves to confront bullying and arbitrary actions by other parties, believing that there is no effective way to protect their rights and interests other than the use of force—thus replacing the rule of law with the law of the jungle.

The Principles of Distinction and Proportionality

Certainly, in any social system one cannot be satisfied with merely prohibiting criminal behavior, because—whether we like it or not—there will always be those who disregard legal constraints and fail to respect the law. This challenge is even more pronounced in the international community, where, due to its structural features and the corresponding weakness of enforcement mechanisms, some members are more likely to fail to comply in practice with established legal norms. Therefore, international law is not limited to prohibiting the threat or use of force; it has also, in a realistic manner, established rules governing situations of armed conflict that must be respected by all parties to a conflict—whether aggressor or defender—regardless of the legality or illegality of the resort to force.

These rules, established primarily with the aim of protecting groups not taking part in hostilities—such as civilians, especially women, children, and the elderly, as well as the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and detainees—and of reducing unnecessary pain and suffering, have largely acquired customary and general validity. Together, they constitute a relatively rich body of law known as international humanitarian law, whose fundamental principles and rules are widely regarded as peremptory norms. Accordingly, attacks against persons, property, places, and any other civilian targets are prohibited. Beyond the general protection afforded to civilian objects, certain categories—such as objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, installations containing dangerous forces, the natural environment, cultural property, and undefended localities—are granted special protection.

Therefore, one of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law is the principle of distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, a rule that enjoys broad international consensus and may be regarded as a clear example of a peremptory norm. Naturally, if civilians take a direct part in hostilities, they lose their protection as civilians for such time as they so participate and, under the law of armed conflict, may be treated as military targets. In applying the principle of distinction, each party to an armed conflict must take the necessary precautions to ensure that civilian objects are not attacked, even incidentally. To this end, all feasible measures must be taken to avoid the selection of means and methods of warfare that would cause incidental harm to civilians, injury to them, or damage to civilian property.

It is also necessary to refrain from launching attacks against military objectives when such attacks may inadvertently cause civilian casualties, injure civilians, or damage civilian property—or any combination thereof—in a manner that would be disproportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Certainly, any assertion that a particular target possesses a military character, or that civilian casualties and damage to civilian property are unavoidable when accounting for military necessity and the principle of proportionality, is a claim for which the burden of proof rests with the party making it. Likewise, American-Zionist attacks directed at a primary school—particularly during hours when hundreds of students and staff are present—cannot be justified under any circumstances within the framework of international humanitarian law. Moreover, targeting stadiums, hospitals, cultural and historical properties, residential homes, and even police stations—whose primary function is to maintain internal order and public security—lacks any valid military justification, particularly in the context of an international armed conflict.

International Law of State Responsibility

Under the principles and rules of the law of State responsibility, any breach of an international obligation by a State gives rise to that State’s international responsibility. Accordingly, the responsible State is required to immediately cease the wrongful act, offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non‑repetition, and provide full reparation for the injury caused to the affected State or States or seek their satisfaction. Consequently, the injured party is entitled to demand that the responsible State comply with these secondary obligations arising from its internationally wrongful act.

However, the challenge lies in identifying mechanisms capable of compelling a State to comply with its obligations. In practice, a State that has committed a wrongful act and breached its primary obligations is often unwilling to accept or fulfil the secondary obligations. This reluctance is particularly evident in the conduct of certain major powers, which are seldom prepared to acknowledge responsibility for their internationally wrongful acts or to comply with the legal consequences that follow. In this regard, the United States, as a non‑compliant State, considers itself beyond the constraints of international law and is unwilling to accept responsibility for its wrongful conduct. However, in general, the international system provides both legal and non‑legal mechanisms to respond to violations of international obligations. Although these mechanisms are not comparable to the enforcement guarantees found in domestic legal systems, if they are properly identified and effectively employed in a timely manner, they may nevertheless exert a degree of pressure on the responsible State—even when that State is a major power—and encourage it to provide reparation for the damage caused, or at least lead to its formal condemnation for committing an internationally wrongful act.

Indeed, the very issuance of a judgment or decision condemning a State for such a violation, beyond its political and moral implications, may also create a legal basis for the adoption of various measures aimed at reparation and compensation. The United States’ military attacks against Iran, in addition to violating the principles of the United Nations Charter reflected in Article 2(4) and Article 2(7), also constitute a breach of that State’s commitments under the Algiers Accords (Declarations). On this basis, these matters are capable of being brought before the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal. Furthermore, the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, amounts to a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (1973), making it a matter that could be pursued before the International Court of Justice.

In addition to giving rise to the international responsibility of the State concerned, violations of the principles and rules governing the use of force and international humanitarian law—forms of conduct regulated under international law—also entail the international criminal responsibility of their individual perpetrators. Accordingly, such individuals, regardless of their political, military, or official position or status, may be subject to prosecution before national or international criminal courts.

The prosecution of individuals accused of these crimes—which include, at a minimum, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—cannot be initiated before the International Criminal Court by the victim State, due to the fact that Iran, the United States, and the Zionist regime are not parties to the Rome Statute. Moreover, there is no realistic prospect that the United Nations Security Council will refer this situation to the Court. However, it may be expected that the Prosecutor of the Court will place the matter on the agenda for investigation. In addition, there is the possibility of filing complaints before national courts, including those of Iran and certain other States, on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction. There is also the possibility of establishing a special criminal tribunal to prosecute and punish those responsible for crimes committed during the two imposed American–Zionist wars against Iran. Such a tribunal could be established with the participation of several States and could address not only crimes committed against the Iranian people and officials, but also crimes committed in Gaza and other countries in the region.

The important point is that careful and consistent efforts must be made to collect documents and evidence demonstrating the wrongful acts and crimes committed by the United States, Zionist regime, and other States, individuals, and institutions supporting them. This will ensure that, when necessary, the relevant cases are ready for filing and prosecution.